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THE TELL-TALE HEART: ETHICAL
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IN





TODAY, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION offers hope to
patients who a few decades ago would have had no chance for
survival. With the development of new surgical techniques and
immunosuppressive drugs, the life-saving potential of organ
transplantation is undisputed. Despite these impressive gains in
medical technology, however, the acute shortage of
transplantable organs continues to be the limiting factor for
organ transplantation.'
Currently, most organ transplants involve organs from
brain-dead donors whose hearts are still beating, otherwise
known as heart-beating cadaver donors (HBCD).2 These pa-
tients make ideal donors because their organs can be main-
tained in a healthy condition through the use of life support
until the family consents to removal of the organs and an ap-
propriate recipient is located. To be declared brain dead, these
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1996.
1. See, e.g., Roger W. Evans et al., Donor Availability as the Primary Determinant of the
Future of Heart Transplantation, 255 JAMA 1892, 1892 (1986) (arguing supply is the most
critical determinant of the future of heart transplants).
2. Stuart J. Youngner & Robert M. Arnold, Ethical, Psychosocial, and Public Policy
Implications of Procuring Organs From Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors, 269 JAMA 2769,
2769 (1993). See also E. Morpurgo et al., Is Warm Ischemia the Main Limiting Factor in the Use
of Non-Heart-Beating Donors in Renal Transplantation?, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1509,
1509 (1993) (using HBCDs as "preferred" source of kidneys); P. Rigotti etal., Non-Heart-Beating
Donors: An Alternative Organ Source in Kidney Transplantation, 23 TRANSPLANTATION PROC.
2579,2579 (1991).
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patients must suffer irreversible cessation of the functions of
the whole brain, including the brain stem? Unfortunately, the
supply of brain-dead donors is inadequate to meet the current
demand for organs.4
The chronic shortage of organs has renewed interest in an
alternative source of organs, particularly for kidneys, which
could increase significantly the number of organs available for
transplantation.5 Recent studies indicate that non-heart-beating
cadaver donors (NHBCD) represent an untapped reservoir of
transplantable organs.' While NHBCDs are usually accident
victims who die of cardiac arrest in the emergency room or
shortly after admission, they also can be stroke or heart attack
victims.7 For example, consider the following hypothetical
case: A seventeen-year-old male accident victim arrives in the
emergency room in full cardiac arrest. He has suffered exten-
sive head trauma as the result of an automobile collision. For
approximately fifteen minutes, doctors try to resuscitate him,
but they are unable to stabilize him or to restart his heart. His
organs, including his kidneys, appear undamaged. His doctors
are unable to locate his family and they can find no organ
donor card. Thus, no attempt can be made to seek permission
3. RENdE C. Fox & JUDITH P. SWAZEY, SPARE PARTS: ORGAN REPLACEMENT IN
AMERIcAN SOCIETY 61 (1992) (noting that the criteria for the declaration of brain death were
developed by the medical and legal communities in the 1970s). See also Paul A. Byrne & Richard
G. Nilges, The Brain Stem in Brain Death: A Critical Review, 9 IssuEs IN L. & MED. 3, 19-20
(1993) (supporting the requirement that all functions of the brain be lost).
4. F. T. Rapaport & D. Anaise, Technical Aspects of Organ Procurement From the Non-
Heart-Beating Cadaver Donor for Clinical Transplantation, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1507,
1507 (1993) ("Careful studies have demonstrated that, even if we were to attain an ideal 95%
consent rate for organ donation from potential brain-dead donors, the resulting supply would fall
far short of the actual need").
5. See D. Anaise & F. T. Rapaport, Use of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors in Clini-
cal Organ Transplantation-Logistics, Ethics, and Legal Considerations, 25 TRANSPLANTATION
PROC. 2153 (1993) (advocating the use of non-heart-beating cadaver donors to increase the supply
of organs for clinical transplantation).
6. A. M. Castelao et al., Update of Our Experience in Long-Term Renal Function of
Kidneys Transplanted From Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver Donors, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC.
1513, 1513 (1993) ("The alternative initiated years ago to take advantage of kidneys from non-
heart-beating cadaver donors (NHBCDs) is steadily increasing to maintain active transplant
programs").
7. See Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153 (asserting there exists a large source of
organs potentially available in trauma victims who suffer cardiac arrest and die in emergency
rooms). See also T. J. M. Ruers et al., Non-Heart-Beating Donors: A Successful Contribution to
Organ Procurement, 18 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 408, 408 (1986) ('These donors die of
circulatory arrest, e.g., due to heart disease, aneurysm, or multitrauma").
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from his family to retrieve his organs. As a consequence, his
organs rapidly deteriorate, rendering them unusable for trans-
plantation. Meanwhile, three other patients in the hospital grow
steadily worse as they wait for a kidney or liver.
This is no longer the only possible outcome. Consider the
alternative: The physicians, after declaring the victim dead,
initiate a procedure to preserve his kidneys for possible dona-
tion. As soon as the decision to start in situ preservation is
made, doctors institute cardiac massage and artificial ventila-
tion to provide the organs with oxygenated blood. The physi-
cians make a longitudinal incision in the donor's groin, and
insert a catheter into the common iliac artery and then into the
aorta. The catheter uses two balloons which inflate to isolate
the arteries leading to the kidneys. Via the catheter, a cold
solution is infused into the aorta and the kidneys. Next, doctors
make an additional incision in the abdomen to provide for an
outflow catheter. Later, once the family has been located and
given the opportunity to agree to organ donation, the kidneys
are removed from the body. In essence, perfusion of the kid-
neys buys time and prevents irreversible damage to the organs
which otherwise would occur within thirty minutes of cessation
of cardiopulmonary function. Instead, the surgeons have up to
five hours to counsel the family and to obtain their consent
before removing the kidneys for transplantation!
In reality, doctors are not likely to attempt in situ perfu-
sion in a case such as the one described above. Their reluc-
tance to institute in situ preservation is based primarily on the
medical community's perception that such a procedure is ethi-
cally and legally problematic without first obtaining the
donor's or the family's consent. This Note focuses on an eval-
uation of these concerns and suggests a model protocol for use
with NHBCDs.
Part I introduces the reader to an alternative source of
organs which may help alleviate the current organ shortage,
namely NHBCDs. Part II provides background on the urgent
8. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2154 (asserting that in situ flush cooling of
NHBCD organs could preserve the organs for at least four to five hours). See also Rapaport &




need for salvageable organs, particularly kidneys, and the state
and federal regulatory frameworks which have attempted to
meet this need. Part III examines the existing policies and
proposals for increasing the supply of organs in the United
States. Part IV addresses the use of NHBCDs in light of the
ethical, moral, and legal issues involved and evaluates the
feasibility of instituting a program using NHBCDs in the Unit-
ed States. Finally, part V concludes that in situ perfusion is a
viable alternative, both legally and ethically, for increasing the
number of available organs for transplantation. Part V also
contains a model protocol for implementation of in situ preser-
vation in the emergency room.
II. BACKGROUND
This section examines the demand for organs in the United
States and the factors that have contributed to the acute short-
age of transplantable organs. In addition, it also reviews exist-
ing model federal and state legislation and analyzes their im-
pact in light of the continuing shortage of organs.
A. Demand and Supply
The need for transplantable organs exceeds the supply of
donors." The most frequently performed transplants are: the
kidney, heart, heart-lung, liver, and pancreas. Moreover, trans-
plantation procedures themselves are on the rise."0 The num-
ber of transplants involving the listed organs rose from 9176 in
1985 to 15,164 in 1990." The escalating demand for organs,
especially kidneys, can be attributed to a number of factors. 2
First, while organ transplantation is still a major medical proce-
dure, it is now considered an option for many patients who
would not have been considered candidates a decade ago. Sec-
9. See Fox & SwAZEY, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that the number of cadaveric organ
donors "plateaued" while demand for organs increased).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Diane L. Manninen & Roger W. Evans, Public Attitudes and Behavior Regarding
Organ Donation, 253 JAMA 3111, 3111 (1985) ("Further complicating the overall donor situa-
tion has been the introduction of seat belt laws, laws requiring the use of child-restraint seats, and
the 55-mph speed limit, all of which effectively reduce donor supply").
474 [Vol. 6:471
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ond, the introduction of powerful immunosuppressive drugs,
such as cyclosporine, has enabled a greater number of patients
to become viable candidates for organ transplantation. 3 While
heart and liver transplants no longer are considered experimen-
tal, kidney transplants unquestionably are the most therapeuti-
cally advanced." Third, the federal government runs the
largest organ transplantation program in the country, which
focuses on providing kidneys for end-stage renal disease pa-
tients.'
The demand for kidneys is intense. For example, in the
early 1990s, over 25,000 patients in the United States were on
the national waiting list for kidney transplantation. 6 Another
12,000 join the list every year. 7 Because of the feasibility of
and high demand for kidney transplants, this Note focuses
primarily on the application of in situ organ preservation for
kidney transplantation. However, in situ organ preservation also
has been successfully performed with livers. At least theoreti-
cally, the procedure is applicable to other organs as well.'
Analyzing the cause of the organ shortage is more com-
plex than explaining the demand. The United States depends
upon a policy of "express donation" to meet its need for
transplantable organs. 9 Typically, doctors will ask the family
to donate the organs of their loved one after brain death is
declared. The family's or the donor's prior consent generally is
13. Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 3, at 7-8 (noting that cyclosporine was a key biomedical
factor in the increase in organ transplants). See also Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153
(describing how drugs have contributed to the increased number of patients on hemodialysis who
are suitable candidates for renal transplantation).
14. Fox & SwAzEY, supra note 3, at 9.
15. James F. Blumstein, Government's Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J.
HEATH POL., POL'Y & L. 5, 11 (1989) (discussing the increase in kidney transplants attributed in
part to transplantation becoming a more cost-efficient alternative than dialysis).
16. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153.
17. Id.
18. Castelao et al., supra note 6, at 1514 (describing the success of liver transplantations
taken from NHBCs). See also R. Shirakura et al., Multiorgan Procurement From Non-Heart-
Beating Donors by Use of Osaka University Cocktail, Osaka Rinse Solution, and the Portable
Cardiopulmonary Bypass Machine, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3093, 3093 (1993)
(experimenting with in situ technique on hearts, lungs, pancreas, and kidneys in mongrel dogs).
19. See Kathleen S. Andersen & Daniel M. Fox, The Impact of Routine Inquiry Laws on
Organ Donation, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1988, at 65, 66 ("Organ donation in this country relies on
the concept of encouraged voluntarism. Either the donor must give consent or surviving persons




required. Unfortunately, experience shows that this altruistic
system fails to produce an adequate number of organs for
donation. 20
The failure of the express donation policy is somewhat
puzzling given survey results indicating the public's willing-
ness to donate organs.2 But the high percentage of individuals
who indicated they would be willing to donate their organs is
deceptive; over sixty-five percent of them had not signed donor
cards.' Although estimates vary widely, approximately
"20,000 people die annually under circumstances that would
make them suitable organ donors."' However, each year only
a small number of people actually become donors.24
Obtaining consent from families to remove organs for
transplantation presents the most formidable obstacle to in-
creasing the organ supply. In a recent study of 6,942 potential
brain-dead donors, consent for donation could be secured only
fifty-seven percent of the time. Compounding the problem is
the attitude of medical professionals towards organ donation
and their inability or unwillingness effectively to discuss the
option of donation with the families of brain dead patients.'
Even where a potential donor has signed a donor card, doctors
are extremely reluctant to overrule a family's wish not to do-
nate.27
20. A. H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation:
Exploring the Alternatives, 9 IssuEs L. & MED. 117, 121 (1993).
21. Arthur J. Matas et al., A Proposal for Cadaver Organ Procurement: Routine Removal
with Right ofInformed Refusal, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 231,232 (1985). See Manninen
& Evans, supra, note 12, at 3111-15 (suggesting that many people who favor organ donations are
uncertain whether they would donate).
22. Matas et al., supra note 21, at 232.
23. Blumstein, supra note 15, at 12.
24. See generally Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153 (citing studies conducted by
the centers for Disease Control and the Battelle-Seattle Research Center regarding obtaining
consent for donation). See also Blumstein, supra note 15, at 12 (noting that the low retrieval rate
translates into a small percentage of potentially transplantable organs being harvested, ap-
proximately 15%). Beverly Metz, The Organ Procurement Problem: Many Causes, No Easy
Solutions, 254 JAMA 3285, 3285 (1985).
25. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153.
26. Stuart J. Youngner et al., "Brain Death" and Organ Retrieval, 261 JAMA, 2205,2210
(1989) (finding that physicians and nurses demonstrated confusion in defining death which may
harm transplantation retrieval). The study explained that "technology is no longer the rate-limiting
factor in human organ transplantation. Rather, it is the ability to obtain organs from suitable do-
nors which depends largely on the attitude and commitment of health professionals." Id.
27. Matas et al., supra note 21, at 235 (describing reluctance of physicians to move
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Yet the pool of available donors must be expanded. While
brain-dead patients with beating hearts presently are preferred
as kidney donors, even in the best of all possible worlds they
will not be able to meet the demand.' Implementing a policy
of in situ organ preservation for NHBCDs is the next logical
step in combatting the organ shortage. Several physicians esti-
mate that the use of NHBCDs could increase the supply of
available organs by five to ten times the current number.29
B. Model, Federal, and State Legislative Responses
1. Model Legislation
Model legislation attempted to address the discrepancy
between the supply and the demand for transplantable organs.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws proposed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), the
best known law, in 1968.30 Forty-one states passed the UAGA
within an eighteen-month period, and ultimately, all fifty states
plus the District of Columbia adopted some version of the
UAGA.31 In 1987, the National Conference approved an
amended version of the UAGA, but the 1987 version does not
enjoy the wide acceptance of the 1968 version.32
From the beginning, the UAGA focused on encouraging
organ donation through the use of organ donor cards. Its efforts
have been met with only limited success.33 To simplify the
donation process, both the 1968 and 1987 versions of the
UAGA provide that an individual's decision to donate, as ex-
pressed by a donor card, does not require the consent of any
other person after the donor's death.34 In reality, however,
deceased for donation in the face of family opposition).
28. See Rigotti, supra note 2, at 2579.
29. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153.
30. UNFORM ANATOMICAL Giwr Acr, 8A U.L.A. 8 (1968). The original 1968 version of
the act adopted by most states was extensively revised in 1987 and contains significant changes.
UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr Ac, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1987).
31. Daphne D. Sipes, Legislative Update on the State Adoption of the 1987 Revision to the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 395, 395 (1990) (illustrating the initial
success of the UAGA).
32. Id. at 398-99 (noting that only eight states have enacted the 1987 version of the
UAGA).
33. Id. at 396 (arguing that although organ donor cards are more prevalent, only 17% of
potential donors have cards, and these cards often are not carried or discovered in time).
34. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 2(e), 8A U.L.A. 100 (1968) (declaring "the rights
19961
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doctors will not proceed without the consent of the family.
Critics of the UAGA contend that this weakness is a contribu-
tor to the UAGA's inability to increase the number of organs
available for transplantation."
The UAGA allows the family to make an anatomical gift
in the absence of an organ donor card or any known objection
to donation on the part of the deceased.36 In the absence of
family members who could consent to donation, the 1987
UAGA created a separate class of individuals capable of autho-
rizing organ donation: public officials. This provision requires,
first, that reasonable efforts be made to locate the deceased's
family. Failing that and barring any knowledge of an objection
to donation, a public official with authority over the body may
make an anatomical gift.37 This provision is similar to legisla-
tion in some states that presumes consent to the removal of
corneas.
The 1987 UAGA also incorporates recent efforts by state
legislators to implement "routine inquiry" and "required re-
quest" laws with the addition of section 5.8 Recently, some
states have implemented laws which encourage donation by
requiring a member of the hospital staff to request organ dona-
tion from the family of every potential donor. Section 5 of the
1987 UAGA follows the lead of these states by providing that
on or before admission to a hospital, patients be asked whether
of the donee created by the gift are paramount to the rights of others"). UNIFORM ANATOMICAL
GiFr AcT § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 34 (1987) (stating "lain anatomical gift that is not revoked by the
donor before death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concurrence of any person
after the donor's death").
35. Wayne L. Anderson & Janolyn D. Copeland, Legal Intricacies of Organ
Transplantation: Regulations and Liability, 50 J. Mo. B. 139, 141 (1994). Andersen & Fox, supra
note 19, at 67 (noting that liability concerns and bad publicity keep physicians from fully using
the Gift Act).
36. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 3, 8A U.L.A. 40 (1987). In this section, the UAGA
has a ranking of individuals within the family who may make this decision. No lower ranking
priority member may override a higher priority member. Obviously, these provisions apply only if
a family member is available. Id.
37. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GiFr AcT § 4, 8A U.L.A. 43 (1987). This provision has not
been widely accepted by the few states which have adopted the 1987 version of the UAGA.
Normally, the public official with authority over the body would be the medical examiner.
Donation will not be allowed unless it will not interfere with the autopsy or investigation and will
occur only where there has been a request for an anatomical gift. Id. See also Sipes, supra note 31,
at 410-12 (explaining that public officials may authorize donation under specific circumstances).
38. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT AcT § 5, 8A U.L.A. 47 (1987) (stating requirements for
hospitals to determine patient donor status).
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they are an organ donor." In addition, the 1987 UAGA man-
dates that a hospital representative discuss the option of organ
donation with the patient's family in the event of the patient's
death where organs appear transplantable.'
Both the 1968 and 1987 versions of the UAGA grant civil
and criminal immunity from liability to any person who acts in
"good faith" while performing an organ transplant.4 This is
among the broadest legislative protections offered to health
professionals. As yet, no health professional has been sued
successfully in an organ transplantation case, but that fact has
done little to alleviate the medical community's concern about
legal liability.42
2. Federal Legislation.
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) made
trade in human organs unlawful.43 The ban on the sale of or-
gans has had a significant impact on the development of trans-
plantation policy, since potential markets for organs or fman-
cial inducements for donations may not be explored. The NO-
TA also provided funding for the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN), a registry of patients in need
of organs which matches donated organs with potential recipi-
ents."
Congress, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986, attempted to enhance donation rates with the Hospital
Protocols for Organ Procurement and Standards for Organ
Procurement Agencies. This federal law requires all Medicare
39. Id. § 5(a) (mandating questions to be asked of patients 18 years and older to determine
if they are an organ or tissue donor).
40. Id. § 5(b) (stating hospitals must discuss organ donation with patients or families).
41. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL Gir ACr § 7(c), 8A U.L.A. 124(1968) (providing "[a] person
who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this Act or with the anatomical gift laws of
another state ... is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any
criminal proceeding for his act"); UNIFORM ANATOmCAL GIF ACT § 11, 8A U.L.A. 59-60
(1987).
42. Anderson & Copeland, supra note 35, at 142 ("One reason why more organ donations
and transplantations do not occur is that many hospitals, physicians, and health professionals are
concerned about legal actions that may potentially be brought against them').
43. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human
transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce').
44. Blumstein, supra note 15, at 12-13.
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and Medicaid hospitals to establish a protocol whereby families
are asked to donate organs. Hospitals that fail to comply with
the law risk losing their federal funding.45
3. State Legislation
As noted previously, most states have routine inquiry and
required request' laws that encourage donation by requiring
hospitals to request that the next-of-kin consider organ dona-
tion. Between 1985 and 1988, forty-four states and the District
of Columbia passed routine inquiry laws in addition to the
UAGA. 47
The success of routine inquiry and required request laws
has been difficult to evaluate due to the lack of reporting re-
quirements. However, one study limited to New York, Oregon,
and California indicated that there was an increase in the num-
ber of referrals for organ donation in the first year after adop-
tion, followed by a subsequent decline.' Based on an evalua-
tion of these states, at least two researchers found that routine
inquiry-required request laws alone will not significantly im-
pact the supply of organs.49
III. EXISTING POLICIES AND PROPOSALS
In the face of the acute shortage of organs, health profes-
sionals, ethicists, and legislators have addressed the problem of
organ shortages through a variety of policy proposals, with
limited success. This section evaluates three of the most prom
45. OMNIBUS BUDGET RECONCILIATION Acr OF 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(l)(A)(i)-
(iii) (1985).
46. The terms routine inquiry and require request have been used interchangeably by state
legislatures, causing confusion but having the same practical effect. Andersen & Fox, supra note
19, at 69.
47. Id.
48. A.O. Gaber et al., An Assessment of the Impact ofRequired Request Legislation on the
Availability of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 318, 319
(1990).
49. See Andersen & Fox, supra note 19, at 75-77 (finding that cumbersome reporting
requirements result in implementation problems). See also Arthur L. Caplan, Professional
Arrogance and Public Misunderstanding, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr.-May 1988, at 34, 35




ising proposals and the feasibility of their implementation in
the United States.
A. Presumed Consent
One alternative to the current policy in the United States
of express donation is a system of presumed consent, such as
the one implemented in Belgium, France, and Austria." Under
presumed consent, generally speaking, doctors may remove
organs so long as there is no known objection. This reduces the
role of the family in the decision-making process. Propo-
nents of presumed consent contend that such a policy would
result in the availability of more organs for transplantation. 2
Presumed consent, however, raises ethical questions by disre-
garding the individual's preferences in the absence of known
objection.
Advocates of presumed consent argue that since the major-
ity of the public favors organ donation, presumed consent
would simplify the donation process. 3 However, a survey
conducted by United Network for Organ Sharing indicated that
presumed consent does not engender the support that organ
donation in general does.54 Nonetheless, presumed consent has
met with some success in this country in the area of cornea
donations. Currently, twenty-one states have laws authorizing
the removal of corneas by medical examiners during autopsy
where no objection to removal is known.5 Most courts have
50. Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff., Am. Med. Ass'n, Strategies for Cadaveric Organ
Procurement, 272 JAMA 809, 810 (1994).
51. Id. See also Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 20, at 121-22 (stating families can refuse
organ donation simply by objecting). There is an even stronger form of presumed consent, called
"conscription," that advocates the removal of organs despite known objections. See Joel Feinberg,
The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1985, at 31, 32 (arguing that
compulsory use of organs is not politically feasible because it ignores religious and personal
objections and may violate the 1st Amendment).
52. Barnett& Kaserman, supra note 20, at 122; Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff., supra
note 50, at 810 (reporting a 140% increase in the number of organs available for transplantation
after Belgium adopted presumed consent).
53. See Council on Ethical and Jud. Aff., supra note 50, at 811 (suggesting presumed
consent is more in line with what most decedents would want).
54. Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 20, at 122-23 (stating 52% of individuals questioned
did not think physicians should be allowed to act based on presumed consent).
55. David Anaise et al., An Approach to Organ Salvage From Non-Heart-Beating Cadaver
Donors Under Existing Legal and Ethical Requirements for Transplantation, 49 TRANS-
PLANTATION PROC., 290, 293 (1990).
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upheld the constitutionality of such laws. 6 The fact that fami-
lies have repeatedly challenged comeal transplant laws, albeit
unsuccessfully, indicates that the backlash from a policy of
general presumed consent could lead to a drastic drop in dona-
tions.5 7
B. Compensation and Organ Markets
Compensation to the families of donors is another pro-
posed solution to the organ crisis. A system of compensation
for organs provides an added incentive for individuals or their
families to donate. Proponents argue that such a system would
result in a higher percentage of families consenting to organ
donation." Nonetheless, Congress, with passage of the Na-
tional Organ Transplantation Act, has continued its policy of
prohibiting compensation for organs. 9
A related alternative is a market system for transplantable
organs. One variation on this theme proposes a "futures mar-
ket" for organs which would entail purchasing an individual's
organs prior to his death.' In such a market system, insurance
companies would purchase and then resell rights to harvest
organs. Another organ market program would offer a market-
determined price from "organ procurement firms" which would
remove organs from donors and sell them to transplant cen-
56. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059
(1987) (upholding constitutionality of comeal removal by medical examiner); Georgia Lions Eye
Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986) (holding
there is no constitutionally protected right in decedent's body); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving
Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. App. 1984) (holding constitutional privacy right does not
apply).
57. See James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for
Transplantation, 14 J. HEALTH POL., PoL'Y & L. 87, 98 (1989) (discussing the dangers of
backlash which could lead to a drastic drop in donations).
58. Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 20, at 124.
59. Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 3, at 65-66. In 1983, Dr. H. Barry Jacobs, the director of
the International Kidney Exchange, Inc., proposed a program to buy and sell human kidneys on a
national and international scale. His proposal included purchasing organs from financially
strapped individuals in Third World countries or the United States and selling the organs to those
who could afford to buy them. This event created the impetus for the National Organ
Transplantation Act. Id.
60. Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, in ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: IssuEs AND PROSPECTS, 57, 62 (James F. Blumstein & Frank A.
Sloan eds., 1989). Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 20, at 125 (describing how some
commentators have proposed a market where the right to harvest a person's organs upon death
would be purchased from him while still in good health).
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ters.6' Once the organs were purchased, they would be distrib-
uted as they are today, on the basis of need.62
Undoubtedly, organ markets and compensation systems do
have the potential for increasing the supply of organs.63 But
considerable opposition exists towards the market and compen-
sation models. Opponents insist that a commercial market in
organs and tissues is abhorrent because it treats human bodies
as parts and commodities.6' Of special concern is the fact that
either system has the potential to coerce; the possibility of
exploitation of donors cannot be overlooked.65 Many ethicists
argue that organ markets are diametrically opposed to the sys-
tem of express donation to which the United States has adhered
in the past.' One prominent ethicist urges that any form of
compensation for organs would violate basic ethical principles,
such as respect for persons and the dignity of individuals.67
Whether a compensation system or market in human or-
gans ever would become a socially acceptable means of meet-
ing the organ shortage in the United States is an open question.
61. Id. at 63.
62. Barnett & Kaserman, supra note 20, at 126 (stating allocation is by the United Network
for Organ Sharing guidelines). The market system can be distinguished from the compensation
system in two ways. One, prices for organs in a market system would fluctuate based on the
demand and supply; in a compensation-oriented scheme, the price would be fixed. Second, under
the market system, the introduction of the procurement firm would greatly increase the incentives
to seek permission for organ removal, thereby reducing the failure-to-ask problem. Id. at 127.
63. See generally David E. Chapman, Comment, Retailing Human Organs Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393 (1983) (suggesting that the sale of
organs under the Uniform Commercial Code would reduce or eliminate the organ shortage); Note,
The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182 (1974) (discussing the market system as
an alternative for increasing the supply of organs).
64. See also E. W. Keyserlingk, Human Dignity and Donor Altruism-Are They
Compatible with Efficiency in Cadaveric Human Organ Procurement?, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PRoc., 1005, 1005 (1990) ("To market human organs for transplantation, or for any other purpose,
would be to market pieces of self, pieces of person, to put a price on human life and health best
thought of as priceless. It would be to exploit both the financially poor organ seller and the
wealthier but desperate organ buyer").
65. Childress, supra note 57, at 101. See also Fox & SWAZEY, supra note 3, at 68-69
(noting that if donors are poor they are especially vulnerable to exploitation, as illustrated by the
trade in kidneys in India).
66. Feinberg, supra note 51, at 32 (arguing that the United States should retain an express
donation system of organ transplantation "since a person's body is essential to his identity while
alive, it becomes a 'sacred possession' whose fate after his death he must actively control, and
these facts are properly recognized only by a system that renders a body's transfer to others into a
freely given gift").
67. James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for
Transplantation, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTAMTON POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECrS, 87,88 (James F.
Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989).
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The answer will be determined by societal and political values
that emerge as the shortage of organs becomes more acute. At
this time, it does not appear to be a viable alternative.
IV. NEW ALTERNATIVE: THE NON-HEART-BEATING
CADAVER DONOR
With the organ shortage becoming increasingly acute, the
time has come to consider an alternative source of
transplantable organs. Despite intensive legislative and public
education efforts, the number of available donors has not in-
creased substantially in the past few years.' As an inevitable
consequence, the average time for patients waiting for kidney
transplants continues to increase. 9  The shortage of
transplantable organs persists despite data indicating a large
number of potential donors exists."
This Note proposes that society turn to a neglected source
of salvageable organs: the non-heart-beating cadaver donors
(NHBCDs). Up to twenty-nine percent of potential donors die
within six hours of hospital admission, and another thirty per-
cent die within twenty-four hours; these patients are never
adequately stabilized on life support, which renders them un-
available as donors under brain death criteria.7 At least one
commentator estimates that utilizing these patients as NHBCDs
could increase the number of available organs eight to ten
times." Unfortunately, most transplant surgeons believe do-
nors must be brain dead in order to constitute a good organ
source.
73
68. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153 (stating despite massive efforts and expen-
ditures, the number of kidneys available for transplantation did not increase substantially between
1987 and 1991).
69. Id. at 5-7.
70. See id. (according to earlier studies the number of potential donors was 27,840, while
recent studies show only 6942 potential donors). See also Youngner & Arnold, supra note 2, at
2769 (claiming since 1991 estimates of the potential pool of HBCDs have been revised downward
from the range of 20,000 to 27,000 to roughly 10,000 to 12,000).
71. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153.
72. Anaise et al., supra note 55, at 293 (arguing that "implementation of an effective
method to protect organs in potential NHBCD from warm ischemia might yield an 8-to-10-fold
increase in the number of organs available for renal transplantation").
73. E. Morpurgo et al., supra note 2, at 1509 (noting that "[alt present, brain-dead, heart-
beating donors are the preferred source of kidneys because donor nephrectomy can be performed
with minimal ischemic damage"). Warm ischemic damage occurs when the organ is not
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Early studies of in situ organ preservation exposed the
difficulties inherent in providing organs suitable for transplan-
tation. Due to a lack of oxygen, organs retrieved from individ-
uals who have suffered from cardiac arrest often are damaged
at the cellular level and are unsuitable for transplantation. In
countries such as Japan where acceptance of the concept of
brain death has been much slower than in the United States,
however, NHBCDs represent the only source of organs. To
combat the inevitable decay of organs, these countries focus on
refiming their in situ organ preservation techniques. Recent
studies show no difference in the long-term survival rate of
NHBCD kidneys versus those from brain-dead donors.74
Doubt no longer exists towards the potential viability of the
procedure, and such concerns cannot constitute a legitimate
reason for restricting its implementation.
Institution of in situ organ preservation in the United
States requires careful analysis of ethical and legal issues. The
most formidable obstacle is the lack of consent from the donor
or the donor's family. Legal and ethical considerations counsel
against proceeding without an individual's informed consent.'
Historically, informed consent could be waived in only two
situations: 1) when the patient was unconscious or otherwise
continuously oxygenated and adequately maintained. Brain dead donors remain on life support
until a few moments before harvesting of the organs, providing high-quality organs. Modern
methods of in situ preservation have greatly reduced ischemic damage. ROBERT M. ARNOLD ET
AL., PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT. THE DEBATE OVER NON-HEART-BEATING CADAVER
PROTOCOLS 1-3 (1995).
74. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2154 (asserting studies have found long-term
survival rate of NHBCD kidneys did not differ significantly from those retrieved from brain-dead
donors). See also N. Matsuno et al., Effectiveness of Machine Perfusion Preservation as a
Viability Determination Method for Kidneys Procured from Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 26
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 2421, 2421-22 (1994) (describing high success rates in early graft
function for kidneys taken from particular NHBD technique); M. J. Yland et al., New Pulsatile
Perfusion Method for Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric Donor Organs: A Preliminary Report, 25
TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3087,3088-89 (1993) (discussing a new preservation method called the
homeostatic perfusion apparatus); R. Valero et al., Organ Procurement From Non-Heart-Beating
Donors by Total Body Cooling, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 3091, 3091-92 (1993) (describing
high success rates in kidneys harvested from N-BDs using the portable total body cooling
technique); N. Matsuno et al., Use of In Situ Cooling and Machine Perfusion Preservation for
Non-Heart-Beating Donors, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PRoC. 3095, 3095-96 (1993) (describing in-
creased success rates of kidneys transplanted from NHBDs when in situ cooling is used).
75. James P. Orlowski et al., The Ethics of Using Newly Dead Patients for Teaching and
Practicing Intubation Techniques, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 440 (1988) (discussing the ethical
problems inherent in teaching and practicing intubation on recently deceased patients without the
consent of the family).
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unable to consent and the harm from not treating was thought
to outweigh the harm from treating; or 2) when disclosure of
risks would be detrimental to the patient due to possible psy-
chological damage to the patient.76 Neither exception is mean-
ingful to the current debate surrounding in situ preservation.
The central issue in situ organ donation is the donor's prior
expressed consent or nonconsent and the donor family's prefer-
ences.
Timing of the procedure requires consideration. When
should resuscitation efforts cease and organ preservation begin?
In other words, when does a "patient" become a "donor?" How
can we be certain the donor really is dead? While cessation of
circulatory and respiratory functions is one of the traditional
definitions of death, today's technology routinely brings people
back from "death" in this sense. Organ procurement facilities
are especially vulnerable to the accusation that the need for
organs will compromise care of the patient. In response to
these concerns, many hospitals implemented policies mandating
separate medical teams; one team of doctors handles the
patient's care until death, and a second team of doctors har-
vests the organs after the patient's death. Unfortunately, this
distinction would be difficult to maintain in the emergency
room setting where a substantial number of in situ procedures
would occur, due to the inherent personnel limitations in that
setting.
Another question is whether the invasion of the corpse the
procedure requires is inherently disrespectful of the deceased
and thus ethically unacceptable. There is also the issue of
whether the need for transplantable organs gives adequate justi-
fication for proceeding without knowledge of the individual's
or family's wishes or possible religious objections. In light of
the obvious need for public support of organ donation, these
issues must be addressed before a policy of routine in situ
76. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (discussing two excep-
tions to the general rule of disclosure). The concept of informed consent has often been expressed
as the idea that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body .... Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(N.Y. 1914), overruled in part by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). See also W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 at 114 (5th. ed. 1984)
(discussing four circumstances in which consent is ineffective).
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preservation can be implemented.
Ethical issues aside, hospitals and doctors must consider
legal liability. For example, it is unclear whether insertion of
the necessary catheters into the NHBCD would rise to the level
of "mistreatment" of a corpse prohibited by state law.7 While
the UAGA provides immunity for actions undertaken in "good
faith" during the organ procurement process, it is unclear
whether that provision would extend to in situ organ preserva-
tion. Hospitals and doctors, sensing their vulnerability, under-
standably may hesitate to employ the procedure without ade-
quate assurance of its legality.
A. Ethical Issues
1. Consent
One of the central issues for in situ organ preservation is
the need and ability to obtain consent from the deceased or the
next of kin.78 In an ideal world, the consent of the individual
or the family would always be obtained before instituting any
organ preservation procedure out of respect for their preferenc-
es. But timely consent often is impossible.
In evaluating consent issues, the individual's claim to
consent is stronger than the family's. If the patient made his or
her wishes clear, for example by advance directive, those wish-
es must be respected.79 If no such indicator exists, then the
deceased patient still must receive respect. This respect is
limited, however, to avoiding disfigurement or mutilation of
the body. While it is conceivable that family members would
view the in situ procedure as "offensive and outrageous," i.e.,
"mistreatment" of the corpse, the need for consent must be
weighed against the need for the organs, or at least the need to
preserve the option to donate."
77. See infra, part IV.B (discussing mistreatment of corpses).
78. Yland et al., supra note 74, at 3087 (commenting that access to NHBCD has been
restricted by the inability to obtain timely consent from the family). See also Youngner & Arnold,
supra note 2, at 2770 (explaining practical and ethical concerns with in situ preservation).
79. Orlowski et al., supra note 75, at 440 (discussing the legal obligation to abide by
patients' wishes).




In situ preservation is a method of enabling a family's
decision to donate in the absence of a clear directive from the
donor. This insures respect for the family in the organ donation
process. Studies show that many families view organ donation
as a form of charity, and even derive comfort from the thought
that part of their loved one lives on."' At the same time, re-
search indicates that pressured discussions with the family
regarding organ donation leave families with negative feelings
about donation.82
If the in situ procedure is done with due respect and with
minimal invasion of the corpse, it is unlikely to be viewed as
mistreatment of the corpse. The body will still be suitable for
viewing, and the option of donation will be preserved. Most
importantly, the procedure buys an additional few hours for the
family to consider donation in an unpressured setting. Thus, the
lack of initial consent should not bar the in situ procedure in
light of its benefits and the fact that it preserves the option of
donation for the family.
2. Definition of Death
According to the Uniform Determination of Death Act,
"[a]n individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessa-
tion of circulatory or respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the
brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in
accordance with accepted medical standards." 3 States have
implemented laws recognizing this dual definition of death. 4
While the precise definition of "brain death" has been a source
81. M.R. Bartucci & M. C. Seller, Donor Family Responses to Kidney Recipient Letters of
Thanks, 18 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 401, 401 (1986) (noting that studies show families often
find comfort through cadaver organ donation).
82. See id. at 403 (discussing these families' negative feelings concerning organ donation).
See also Matas et al., supra note 21, at 233 (discussing family member's explanation of why
physician's questions regarding organ donation from husband's body was a negative experience).
83. UNiFORM DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT, reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBS. IN MED. AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV. REs., DEFINING DEATH:
A REPORT ON THE MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH
app. at 119 (1981) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N].
84. David R. Smith, Legal Recognition of Neocortical Death, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 850,




of controversy in the medical field, the complete cessation of
all functions of the brain is accepted widely.'
What is not clear is where to draw the line conceptually in
distinguishing the precise moment when an individual shifts
from patient to donor. How long after cessation of the heart-
beat and respiration should physicians wait before declaring an
individual dead? Commentators express the fear that the use of
NHBCDs will compromise the care of potential donors while
they are living or during resuscitation efforts. That decisions
concerning the withdrawal of life support or cessation of resus-
citation efforts may be affected by the physician's desire to
render the organs more viable for transplantation is of great
concern. 6 More specifically, those interested in obtaining or-
gans for transplantation may be tempted to use "direct means
to hasten death, to try to control the time of death, to use med-
ications and other measures to ensure organ viability, and so
forth ... ,,87
While these concerns apply to brain dead patients on life
support, they have relevance for in situ organ preservation as
well. Due to time constraints, preservation must occur within
minutes of death. 8 Without a clear protocol for the length and
intensity of resuscitation efforts for trauma victims, the percep-
tion may be that potential donors are treated only as a means
to the end of organ donation. To prevent this perception, the
pronouncement of death must meet specific criteria before the
start of organ procurement procedures. First, there must be
cessation of the cardiopulmonary system; that is, both the
heartbeat and respirations must cease. Second, and most impor-
tant, cessation must be irreversible.
The concept of irreversibility emerges as perhaps the most
85. Id. (stating majority of states have supplemented the cardiopulmonary test of cessation
of heart and lung functions with a whole brain death standard).
86. See Ren~e C. Fox, "An Ignoble Form of Cannibalism": Reflections on the Pittsburgh
Protocol for Procuring Organs from Non-Heart-Beating Cadavers, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J.
231 (1993) (describing the Pittsburgh Protocol as "medically rationalized cannibalism").
87. James F. Childress, Non-Heart-Beating Donors of Organs: Are the Distinctions Be-
tween Direct and Indirect Effects & Between Killing and Letting Die Relevant and Helpful?, 3
KENNEDY INsT. ETcs J. 203, 210 (1993) (discussing patients who have chosen "comfort
measures only").
88. Anaise et al., supra note 55, at 293 (explaining that femoral cannulation of a potential
donor must be done immediately after death).
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difficult problem when considering the use of NHBCDs as
organ sources. Thus the crucial question becomes how long a
resuscitation effort is enough? In one program, at the Universi-
ty of Pittsburgh, physicians wait a mere two minutes after the
onset of cardiac arrest before proceeding to harvest the donor's
organs.89 While the Pittsburgh Protocol, as this procedure is
known, deals exclusively with terminal patients whose families
have consented to organ donation, at least one ethicist has
questioned the sincerity of the protocol's commitment to the
irreversibility of cardiac function before harvesting.' Clearly,
any perception by the public that doctors "kill" patients in or-
der to retrieve their organs would have a devastating impact on
the future of organ transplantation.
The President's Commission Advisory Guidelines provide
some assistance by defining irreversibility as the absence of
function for a finite period.9' Commentators argue that an ac-
ceptable waiting period varies as much as from seven to thirty
minutes.92 The Advisory Guidelines caution that where death
is sudden or unexpected, the examination should be conducted
over a longer period, be more extensive, and the resuscitation
efforts should be continued during the examination.93 Since in
situ preservation most likely will apply to trauma victims who
arrest in or shortly before arriving at the emergency room, doc-
89. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Policy and Procedure Manual, reprinted in
PROCURING ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANT:. THE DEBATE OVER NON-HEART-BEATING CADAVER
PROTOCOLS app. at 235, 240 (Robert M. Arnold et al. eds., 1995) (presenting the full text of the
Pittsburgh Protocol). The Pittsburgh Protocol is a unique program at the University of Pittsburgh
whereby terminally ill patients may choose to become donors after their death. The patient is
weaned off the respirator in an operating room, given pain medication for comfort only, and
allowed to die. Approximately two minutes after cessation of a regular heart beat, the patient is
declared dead and the organs removed. Id. Patients may not actually be "dead" since theoretically
they might still be capable of resuscitation. This scenario is readily distinguished from in situ
procedures because informed consent has already been obtained prior to weaning the patient off
the respirator.
90. Fox, supra note 86, at 233 (asking whether "shortening the timing of electro-
cardiographic criteria for certifying death to two minutes [is] a technologically sophisticated way
of disguising the fact that organ procurement does in fact begin before the patient/donor is
unambiguously and irreversibly dead?").
91. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 83, at 162.
92. See Fox, supra note 86, at 232-33 (implying that six to seven minutes may be an
acceptable amount of time to wait to diagnose death). See also M. G6mez et al., Cardiopulmonary
Bypass and Profound Hypothermia as a Means for Obtaining Kidney Grafts From Irreversible
Cardiac Arrest Donors: Cooling Technique, 25 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1501, 1501 (1993)
(advocating at least 30 minutes of sustained resuscitation before declaring death).
93. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 83, at 162.
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tors must make every effort to assure that they cannot restore
circulatory and respiratory function.
The proposed protocol for the institution of in situ organ
preservation contained in the conclusion of this Note recom-
mends ten to fifteen minutes as an acceptable period of inten-
sive resuscitation effort for trauma victims. The use of such a
parameter will assure that physicians insert, catheters into the
deceased only after irreversible cessation of cardiac function
has been definitively established.
3. Respect for the Dead
Is in situ organ preservation ethically and morally justifi-
able? Does it treat human beings only as a means and not as
an end? Such inquiries express our traditional beliefs concern-
ing the sacredness of the recently deceased.94 Ethical debates
regarding the treatment of corpses have raged since man dis-
covered how useful the study of human bodies could be.9"
Each culture maintains its own views of what constitutes the
proper treatment of dead bodies, thus there are different reli-
gious practices, rituals, and superstitions. Historically, clashes
have occurred between the goals of medicine and society's
sensibilities regarding permissible acts. One early example of
this tension was the grave robbing by medical students in the
18th and 19th centuries to obtain cadavers to study. The out-
raged public rioted in protest.' These feelings persist in mod-
em times. For example, autopsies may be worthwhile, but
often are traumatic for families because of their desire not to
have the bodies of their loved ones mutilated.'
Many of these same concerns arise in the arena of organ
transplantation. Here, donors often are young persons whose
deaths are an undeniable tragedy. In order for organ donation,
or specifically in situ preservation, to be successful, one cannot
94. A. Lynch, Respect for the Dead Human Body: A Question of Body, Mind, Spirit,
Psyche, 22 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1016, 1016 (1990) (discussing examples of respect for the
dead body). See also Feinberg, supra note 51, at 31-37 (discussing philosophical aspects of
harvesting organs from dead bodies).
95. Feinberg, supra note 51, at 31.
96. Stuart J. Youngner, Organ Retrieval: Can We Ignore the Dark Side?, 22




ignore the public's sensibilities to the detriment of organ trans-
plantation.9" One ethicist argues that aggressive organ dona-
tion programs may even make hospitals into an institutional
symbol for a world that devours its patients." In fact, a mix-
ture of functions already exists within most hospitals. For
example, some patients enter the hospital for treatment while
others come to the hospital to make their passing more peace-
ful and less painful.
The symbolism of the corpse is very powerful, for the
corpse is an embodiment of the living person it once was."
But symbolism alone is not sufficient to deny medical access
to corpses for research."0 ' This is not to say that organ dona-
tion or in situ cooling is always appropriate. As Justice
Cardozo noted, "sentiments and usages devoutly held as sacred,
may not be flouted for caprice."'" To ignore deeply felt reli-
gious beliefs which prohibit organ transplantation might well
violate the freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.103 Certain religious groups object to organ donation be-
cause they believe in personal immortality. Other religions en-
courage organ donation as an act of charity to the less fortu-
nate; the practice is not seen as disrespectful so long as the
procedure is conducted with reverence."
Considerable philosophical discussion exists regarding the
obligation to provide for posthumous respect in the context of
organ donation. One basis for such an obligation is that "re-
spect for the cadaver is offered because that is what one wishes
for oneself."' 5 One ethicist explained that "[s]ome recogni-
tion of the human body.., is required as marking respect
98. Id. at 1015 (noting concerns of using cadavers in medical experiments or for organ
retrieval). See also Feinberg, supra note 51, at 31 (describing a congressman's outrage at
discovering that the Department of Transportation was using cadavers in testing designs for
automobile air bags).
99. Feinberg, supra note 51, at 36.
100. Lynch, supra note 94, at 1017 (discussing the need for dignity and respect of the newly
dead).
101. See Feinberg, supra note 51, at 32 (discussing the distinction between actual symbols
observed and the interests they represent).
102. Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128-29 (N.Y. 1926).
103. Feinberg, supra note 51, at 32.
104. Lynch, supra note 94, at 1017 (explaining that many Christian denominations en-




during the organ retrieval process."" 6 One way proposed to
express reverence towards the newly deceased is the observa-
tion of a moment of silence, either pre- or post-organ retriev-
al." 7 Such rituals not only convey a sense of respect for the
deceased and the deceased's family, but assist the trans-
plantation teams with the more dehumanizing aspects of their
task.
Of equal concern is the feeling that the use of the recently
deceased for the benefit of others cheapens life and numbs our
sense of respect for the dead.08 Indeed, the Kantian injunc-
tion that persons should always be treated as autonomous ends
and not merely as means to the ends of others appears difficult
to reconcile with organ transplantation."° For organ trans-
plantation to be morally justifiable, it must provide organs for
those who need them while respecting the human dignity of
donors. This is possible only in a conceptual framework that
considers organ donation to be an expression of the beauty of
life, a gift based on a respect for human dignity. Medical pro-
cedures performed on the recently deceased need not be inher-
ently disrespectful. The use of a moment of silence and genu-
ine compassion for the deceased and the family will assure that
an appropriate sense of dignity is maintained.
B. Legal Liability
The family's legal rights to the protection and possession
of the corpse of a loved one have evolved over time. English
common law held that the family of the deceased had no prop-
erty rights in the body, and therefore the corpse could not be
106. Id.
107. Stuart Youngner et a]., Psychosocial and Ethical Implications of Organ Retrieval, 313
NEw ENG. J. MED. 321, 323 (1985) (discussing rituals appropriate to reduce perplexity and
minimize problems associated with organ retrieval). See also M. J. Lynch, Dutyfor Respecting the
Dead Body, 22 TIANsPLANTATION PROC. 1021, 1022 (1990) (quoting the following prayer "We
thank you for your assistance today. We are grateful to the patient and to the donor family who
have enabled us to be here today. We believe others will be helped by this donation. (Pause for
silence.) We can begin now").
108. See Feinberg, supra note 51, at 35-36 (acknowledging possible negative effects of
routine harvesting of organs, but arguing that such concerns can be marginalized while reaping the
benefits of organ harvesting).
109. Keyserlingk, supra note 64, at 1005 ("[A] morally justifiable policy will be one which
is likely to provide the largest number of needed and available organs for potential recipients,
without violating the human dignity of potential donors").
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disposed of by will." ' Historically, the primary reason for
this rule was that all matters concerning dead bodies were
under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts.' Today,
modem courts more willingly recognize the right of possession
of a corpse by the next-of-kin. However, the family still has no
absolute property right to the body of their deceased rela-
tive."' Rather, families are given a limited "quasi-property"
right to the body of the deceased."' This right usually ex-
tends only to possession for burial."4 Furthermore, families
have no constitutionally protected right of privacy to the
decedent's body."'
Nevertheless, many state laws do prohibit doctors or other
people from performing procedures on dead bodies without the
express consent of the family or authority from the state. 6
For example, an unauthorized autopsy can give rise to liabili-
ty.1 7 Some courts, however, have found that certain routine,
non-deforming medical procedures do not constitute mutilation,
and thus are not actionable."8
In the leading case of State v. Powell,"9 the Florida Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that the Constitution pro-
110. Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659,665 (1882) (stating that because no property right
exists in a corpse, it cannot be disposed of through a will).
1 11. Erik S. Jaffe, Note: She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
528,550 n.106 (1990).
112. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059 (1987)
(holding no property rights exist in decedent's body).
113. Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1084 (1986) (recognizing at common law the "quasi-property" interests of surviving
relatives).
114. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192.
115. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, 335 S.E. 2d at 128.
116. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.01 (Baldwin 1994) (prohibiting actions which
would outrage reasonable family or community sensibilities); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§ 71 (West 1990); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4218 (McKinney 1985).
117. Torres v. State, 228 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (1962) (holding that State was liable for
family's mental suffering and expenses resulting from unauthorized autopsy).
118. Parker v. Quinn-McGowen Co., 138 S.E.2d 214, 216 (N.C. 1964) (holding that
unauthorized embalming of a body is not considered mutilation); People v. Bullington, 80 P.2d
1030, 1032 (Cal. 1938) (finding that removal of two gold crowns from teeth of the dead body was
not mutilation of the corpse). See also Anaise et al., supra note 55, at 293 (noting these procedures
include small groin incisions to determine the extent of an abscess and the unauthorized
embalming of a body).
119. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193 (upholding a state statute permitting medical examiners to
remove corneas for transplantation during autopsies provided there is no known objection by the
family).
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tects the right of the next-of-kin to the remains of a deceased
family member. The Powell court addressed a state statute
which permitted removal of corneas without the consent of the
family or the donor. According to the court, corneal removal is
not disfiguring because it requires an "infinitesimally small
intrusion which does not affect the decedent's appearance. 120
In addition, the court stressed that under Florida state law,
there is no familial "property" right per se to the decedent's
body; at most, the family has a "quasi-property" right - the
right to possession of the body for burial.2  The court also
rejected the argument that the family's privacy had been violat-
ed by the coroner's failure to obtain their consent. Instead, the
court held that neither federal nor state privacy laws could
protect an individual from the government's intrusion, especial-
ly when the public's health is at stake." In support of its de-
cision, the court held that the statute was rationally related to
the state's objective of promoting corneal transplantation for
the blind."n
Several other courts use similar reasoning to conclude that
the next-of-kin maintains only a limited property right in the
body of a loved one. 24 The courts in Georgia Lions Eye
Bank and Tillman both held that regardless of the "quasi-prop-
erty" right held by the respective families, their interests in the
body of the deceased failed to rise to the level of a constitu-
tionally protected liberty or property interest and failed to raise
due process concerns.
In Brotherton v. Cleveland, however, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that harvesting corneas during an
autopsy pursuant to an Ohio statute constituted a deprivation of
a property right which required due process protection."n The
120. Id. at 1191 (capping decedent's eyes maintains normal appearance of body).
121. Id. at 1192 ("[T]he next-of-kin's right in a decedent's remains is based upon 'the
personal right of the decedent's next-of-kin to bury the body rather than any property right in the
body itself."' (quoting Jackson v. Rupp, 228 So. 2d 916, 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)).
122. Id. at 1193.
123. Id. at 1193-94 (holding statute encourages state's interest in restoring sight to blind).
124. Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1084 (1986) (holding that removal of corneal tissue pursuant to state statute did not violate
due process); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. App. 1984)
(holding that privacy rights encompassing the right to make decisions concerning the integrity of
one's body ends with death).
125. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,482 (6th Cir. 1991) (recognizing property rights
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circuit court reversed the district court's holding that neither
statutory nor case law of Ohio recognized a property right in a
relative's remains. Instead, the circuit court determined that the
recognition of a property right under state law was unnecessary
because federal law governs whether an interest rises to a
"legitimate claim of entitlement."'"
In Brotherton, the wife of the deceased refused the
hospital's request to make an anatomical gift. Her refusal was
duly noted in the hospital's Report of Death. During the subse-
quent autopsy, the coroner authorized the removal of the
deceased's corneas. Ohio law permits the removal of corneas
by the coroner where the coroner has no knowledge of a prior
objection of the decedent or the decedent's spouse or next of
kin. 7 At the time, the coroner's office did not customarily
request the hospital's documents prior to removing the cor-
neas. 1
Brotherton's wife brought a claim under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act 129 for deprivation of a property right
without due process. To assert a claim under section 1983, a
plaintiff must show: 1) the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law; and 2) the depriva-
tion was of a right, privilege, or immunity guaranteed by the
Constitution. The central issue in Brotherton was whether the
wife's interest in her husband's body gave rise to a constitu-
tionally protected property right.
The reasoning of the majority in Brotherton was unusual
because it chose to disregard the relevant Ohio law as the
source of property law. 3 Instead, the Brotherton court ex-
to decedent's corneas).
126. Id. at 481-82 (holding federal rather than state law determines whether interest rises to
level protected by due process clause).
127. OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2108.60 (Baldwin 1994).
128. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 478.
129. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
130. Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-82 (holding federal rather than state law governs whether
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trapolated from the rights vested in survivors to consent to the
donation of a relative's organs under the Ohio UAGA to an
aggregate claim of entitlement.' Even more puzzling, the
majority in Brotherton relied on a section of the Ohio code
which expressly limits the rights of survivors in making ana-
tomical gifts.' In contrast, other federal appeals courts ad-
dressing section 1983 claims based on property rights in cadav-
ers have relied exclusively on state law as a source of these
rights. 133
The Sixth Circuit's ruling in Brotherton encourages recog-
nition of property rights in dead bodies and, possibly, commer-
cialization of those rights. This obviously creates a tension
with current federal policies favoring donation and banning the
sale of human organs. 34 Thus far, the courts have attempted
to steer away from encouraging the commercialization of body
parts. For this reason, the Sixth Circuit's ruling is not like-
ly to alter the prevailing view which limits the recognition of
property rights in cadavers.
While in situ organ preservation does not involve the
removal or destruction of any body parts, concern remains that
the initiation of the procedure without the family's consent
would infringe upon the patient's or the family's liberty or
property interests. The risk of legal liability from preservation
procedures must be evaluated from both the donor's and the
family's perspectives. An individual's expressed intent not to
become a donor always should be honored, despite the fact that
interest rises to level necessary for due process protection). See Michael H. Scarmon, Note,
Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Hunan Body-Are The Goods Oft Interred With
Their Bones?, 37 S.D. L. REv. 429, 433,466 (1992).
131. Scarmonsupra note 130, at 446.
132. Id. at 447.
133. See Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding the relatives of a
deceased prisoner who sued for negligent destruction of organs during an autopsy were not
deprived of due process); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 307-08 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 855 (1989) (holding state remedies for tort claims satisfy deprivations of property or
liberty interests); Lawyer v. Kemodle, 721 F.2d 632,635 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding defendant acting
under color of state law).
134. Scarmon, supra note 130, at 447 (discussing the ramifications of establishing
broadened property rights in dead bodies).
135. See generally Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494,503-09 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988), modified, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991) (finding no




one no longer has the right (or ability) to consent to or to
refuse medical treatment after death."z The courts also have
held that patients no longer have a constitutional right to priva-
cy following death.137
Legally, the recently deceased potential donor who has
expressed no preference concerning organ donation has only
the right to be free of mutilation and mistreatment. The donor's
consent to organ donation is not at issue if no prior preference
has been expressed. However, one still must evaluate whether
the use of in situ procedures could run afoul of state statutes
forbidding mistreatment of corpses." 8 The medical communi-
ty generally regards in situ preservation as semi-invasive, and
thus does not render the body unsuitable for viewing. There-
fore, it is unlikely that in situ preservation will be viewed as
mistreatment of the corpse.'39 As one commentator has noted,
the best legal protection against liability for non-mutilating
procedures performed upon the recently deceased would be
legislation permitting an exception to informed consent.Y
Until such legislation is passed, however, it is impossible to
say with certainty that the in situ procedure is free from the
risk of liability under state law.
In addition to state law, other potential sources of liability
exist. For example, the UAGA, in conformity with the common
law, expressly grants the right to the next-of-kin to control
disposal of the body. 4' Interference with this right could give
136. Orlowski et al., supra note 75, at 440 ("If the patient has indicated by will, durable
power of attorney, or other advance directive what he or she wishes to be done with the body or
bodily parts after death, then these expressed interests must be respected and followed unless
circumstances clearly override such an interest").
137. Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. App. 1984) ("The
privacy right which encompasses the right to make decisions concerning the integrity of one's
body is a personal one. It ends with the death of the person to whom it is of value. It may not be
claimed by his estate or his next-of-kin").
138. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7052 (West Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
272, § 71 (West 1990); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4218 (McKinney 1985); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 2927.01 (Anderson 1993).
139. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059
(1987) (describing cornea removal as "an infinitesimally small intrusion which does not affect the
decedent's appearance").
140. Orlowski et al., supra note 75, at 441 (advocating new legislation permitting the use of
corpses for nondisfiguring training programs).
141. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFr Acr § 3 U.L.A. 40 (1987) (listing of next-of-kin who
control donation decisions in order of authority).
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rise to a cause of action for tortious interference with a dead
body. 42 In cases where the tort is accompanied by willful or
wanton conduct, recovery for mental anguish is possible.143 In
one recent case claiming tortious interference with a body, the
court required the plaintiffs to show either a physical impact or
malicious conduct by the defendant.'"
In Gonzalez, the plaintiff parents sued a funeral home
which mistakenly buried the wrong infant at their daughter's
funeral. Because the court found no allegations or evidence of
physical impact and because the funeral home had no mali-
cious intent, the court affirmed summary judgment for Dade
County. 45 The parents unsuccessfully argued that the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 868 should apply, providing
that "[o]ne who intentionally, recklessly or negligently re-
moves, withholds, mutilates or operates upon the body of a
dead person or prevents its proper interment or cremation is
subject to liability to a member of the family of the deceased
who is entitled to the disposition of the body."'" The
Restatement's position, however, is the minority view, 47 and
the Gonzalez court rejected it as contrary to Florida state
law. '
Since in situ organ preservation involves the intentional
insertion of catheters, it could fall within the scope of the
Restatement's minority view, but only if the procedure is seen
as "mutilating" or is viewed as "operating" upon the body. The
procedure would not deprive the family of the body for burial,
however, nor would any of the incisions be noticeable once the
corpse was clothed. Therefore this procedure is unlikely to be
perceived as mistreatment of the corpse. While the insertion of
142. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1191 (discussing how interference with limited right to body for
burial may cause action for tortious interference).
143. PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES
144 (2d ed. 1950) (underlying principles of tort law are applicable in cadaver cases).
144. Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Dade County Pub. Health Trust, 626 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (Fla.
Dist. CL App. 1993), affd, 651 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1995) (failing to prove physical impact or
malicious conduct results in no recovery for tortious interference).
145. Id. at 1033.
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 868 (1979).
147. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 362
(5th ed. 1984) (providing for recovery to families for negligent mishandling of corpses).
148. Gonzalez, 626 So. 2d at 1033 (stating that only two cases in Florida dealt with § 868
and neither case relied upon the Restatement for its decision).
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catheters would be intentional, such conduct is hardly "willful
and wanton," rising to the level of an intentional tort.
Under the prevailing common law rule, in situ preserva-
tion carries little risk of liability because it does not interfere
with generally accepted liberty or property interests of the
decedent's family or with the family's right to control the
disposition of the body. If the family chooses not to donate, the
body can be released to their care immediately. Similarly,
under the minority or Restatement view, intentional mutilation
of the body is required for a cause of action to arise. The in
situ procedure is not likely to be interpreted as mutilating, and
thus the risk of liability is low.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note attempts to address the most important legal
and ethical considerations involved in the practice of in situ
organ preservation. None of these considerations present insur-
mountable obstacles to the adoption of the practice. In advocat-
ing the adoption of the in situ procedure, at least within a
limited test area, a number of strong arguments exist favoring
such a trial.
First, the potential success of in situ cooling has already
been demonstrated by a number of research teams.49 Ade-
quate background research has been conducted, and it is time
to test the practice on a broader scale. Second, the procedure is
a better alternative to existing procedures and policies because
it preserves for the family the right to donate. Moreover, it is
not as ethically objectionable to the American public as are
presumed consent, compensation, or organ markets. Third,
society has an ethical obligation to attempt to increase the pool
of donors while respecting the individual's and family's deci-
sion whether or not to donate.
Among the remaining obstacles to the successful imple-
mentation of the procedure is the lack of federal legislation
149. Anaise & Rapaport, supra note 5, at 2153-54 (citing studies in the United States,
Europe, and Japan which demonstrate the potential value of in situ cooling). See also Ruers et al.,
supra note 7, at 408-10. D. Anaise et al., Flush Pressure Requirements for Optimal Cadaveric
Donor KidneyPreservation, 20 TRANSPLANTATION PRoc. 891,891-94(1988) (studying the effect
of in situ cooling techniques on cadaveric kidneys).
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permitting deferred family consent. Without this crucial legisla-
tion, hospitals and physicians cannot be adequately assured of
immunity from liability. Lack of immunity and its implication
of possible liability deters health care providers from using the
in situ procedure.
Once the appropriate legislation has been passed, adoption
of the protocol proposed below will adequately safeguard
against possible abuses of the procedure. The protocol provides
guidelines to assure that physicians will perform the procedure
only when resuscitation has proved futile. Furthermore, its
adoption will encourage public debate about the option of in
situ preservation. Participation by the public is essential to
garner support for this procedure in particular and for organ
donation in general.15
Most importantly, in situ organ preservation will safeguard
the family's right to make an informed decision about organ
donation. The time before harvest that the procedure provides
affords the family the opportunity to decide in an unpressured
setting what their loved one would have wanted. It allows
families time to give the gift of life without adding to their
grief.
The following protocol is suggested for implementation of
in situ organ preservation at facilities adequately equipped to
perform organ transplantation:
The hospital must consider as potential organ donors all
patients who develop irreversible cardiac arrest in any of the
following circumstances: 1) patients with severe head injury; 2)
patients with stroke; 3) patients who are brain dead; and 4) pa-
tients with known severe heart disease.
Before the determination of death, the following criteria
must be met: 1) cardiac unresponsiveness after cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation of at least ten to fifteen minutes duration; 2)
no cardiac activity for five minutes after cessation of resuscita-
tion efforts; and 3) absence of brain activity after fifteen min-
utes of resuscitation at normal body temperature.
150. Youngner et al., supra note 107, at 323 (quoting William May, "[i]t is not advisable in
the pursuit of worthy social goals to sidestep or repress the element of aversion with respect to
means .... The question remains whether a system that overrides rather than faces up to profound
reservations is not, in the long run, more ghoulish in its consequences for the social order").
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In the absence of a donor card, all reasonable attempts
must be made to obtain the family's permission during the
resuscitation effort. If the victim carried a donor card or other-
wise indicated his or her willingness to become a donor, no
family consent is necessary for the institution of the procedure,
although obtaining the family's consent is strongly recommend-
ed. If there is no donor card and the family is unavailable to
consent, the procedure should be instituted, but no additional
steps may be taken to retrieve the organs until consent has
been obtained. The catheters may remain in the body for up to
four hours."'
This protocol, if diligently followed, will address the legal
and moral concerns raised in this Note while substantially
increasing the organ donor pool. The introduction and use of
such a protocol is the first step towards public awareness and,
hopefully, acceptance of in situ preservation as a means of
increasing the number of organs available for donation.
151. See G6mez, supra note 92, at 1501-02 (describing one institution's program for donor
selection).
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